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Assets Securities
Land Non-land Value Type
181,820 18,180 200,000 Common stock
   818,197      81,810   900,000 Preferred stock
1,000,000 100,000 1,100,000
(91.91%) (9.09%)
With the decedent holding 78.64 percent of the preferred
stock, 78.64 percent of $818,197 or $643,343 would be
eligible for special use valuation.
Assuming that special use value is 20 percent of fair
market value, 20 percent of $643,343 or $128,681 would be
the special use value of the land. Adding to that the
decedent's share of the non-land assets (78.64 percent times
$81,810 or $64,335), the decedent's preferred stock would
have a value of $193,016 or $27.27 per share.
The ruling by contrast, reaches the startling conclusion
that the common stock has no value. Obviously, the
common stock does have value, arguably the residual above
the preferred's par value or $200,000 in amount.
FOOTNOTES
1 I.R.C. § 2032A(g).  See generally 5
Harl, Agricultural Law § 43.03[2][e]
(1992).
2 See I.R.C. § 2032A(g). 
3 Maddox v. Comm'r, 93 T.C. 228
(1989).
4 Ltr. Rul. 9220006, Jan. 29, 1992.
5 See generally 6 Harl, supra n. 1, §
46.02[2] (gift tax); 8 Harl, supran.
1, § 58.05[2][c] (estate tax).
6 The helpful comments by Prof. J.
A. Kasner, University of Santa
Clara School of Law, are
acknowledged.  See Kasner, "Special
Use Valuation Permitted for
Preferred Stock in Ranch
Corporation" ("But there Is a
Catch"), 56 Tax Notes 98 (1992).
7 January 29, 1992.
8 Ltr. Rul. 8131007, April 22, 1981.
9 See I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(1)(C)(ii).
10 See 5 Harl, supra n. 1, §
43.03[2][e].
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANTI-TRUST
LEASES . The plaintiffs were sugarcane farmers who
subleased land from the defendants who leased the land from
the owners. The defendants also owned sugarcane mills and
required the plaintiffs to sign leases which required the
tenants to deliver all sugarcane grown on the land to the
mills owned by the sublessors. The court ruled that such
"tying arrangements" were a violation of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act in that the arrangements eliminated competition in
the geographical area around each mill. The court applied the
law to the limited geographical area around the mills because
it found that the economic feasibility of growing and selling
sugarcane was limited to transportation distances of about 25
miles. Breaux Bros. Farms, Inc. v. Teche Sugar
Co., Inc.,  792 F. Supp. 1436 (W.D. La. 1992).
BANKRUPTCY
   GENERAL   
DISCHARGE . The debtor was found guilty of several
willful violations of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural
Worker Protection Act and the plaintiffs in that suit sought
collateral estoppel effect of that judgment such that the
judgment amount was nondischargeable in the debtor's
bankruptcy case. The court held that the judgment amount
was nondischargeable except as to the judgments entered
because of the default of the debtor. In re Kallmeyer,
143 B.R. 271 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1992).
ESTATE PROPERTY . On the day prior to the filing
for bankruptcy, the debtors' parents executed a deed for 60
acres of farmland to the debtors. The deed was recorded an
hour after the filing of the petition. The debtors had thought
that the bankruptcy petition was filed before the deed was
executed and attempted to disclaim the deed post-petition.
The court held that the property was transferred to the debtors
before the bankruptcy filing and was estate property, making
the disclaimer an unauthorized transfer of estate property. In
re Strotheide, 142 B.R. 850 (Bankr. S .D.  I l l .
1992).
The debtors' Chapter 11 plan was confirmed and
substantially consummated when the debtors defaulted on
payments to a secured creditor.  The debtors claimed that
they transferred all of their post-petition farm property to
their son in exchange for lifetime support and filed a motion
to convert the case to Chapter 7. The bankruptcy court had
dismissed a motion by the trustee to adjudicate the parties'
rights to the property because after confirmation of the plan,
all property reverted back to the debtors such that no
bankruptcy estate remained subject to bankruptcy court
jurisdiction. The litigation moved to state court where it was
held that the property transfer was ineffective.  The court in
this case held that because it had no jurisdiction to affect the
state court ruling and the property was no longer bankruptcy
estate property, the issue of the rightful owner of the
property was moot and beyond the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. In re Helms, 142 B.R. 964 (D. Kan.
1992).
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtors were not allowed to
avoid a judgment lien against heir homestead where the
debtors had no equity in the homestead eligible for an
exemption. Matter of Arevalo, 142 B.R. 111
(Bankr. D. N.J. 1992).
The debtors had claimed a tractor as exempt and had
received a discharge in 1988. The tractor was subject to a
nonpossessory, nonpurchase money security interest which
was not avoided in the case. The creditor sought to reopen
the case to obtain an order for recovery of the tractor under
the lien. The debtor argued that Owen v. Owen, 111 S.Ct.
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1833 (1991) allowed avoidance of such liens against tools of
a trade. The court refused to apply Owen retroactively to a
case which had been closed prior to the decision. In re
Blackstone, 142 B.R. 146 (Bankr. N.D.  Tex.
1992).
The debtor claimed two farm tractors as exempt und r
Tex. Prop. Code § 42.002(a) as tools of the trade. The debtor
sought avoidance of a nonpurchase money, nonpossessory
security interest in the tractors. The creditor argued that
Owen v. Owen, 111 S.Ct. 1833 (1991) should not be
applied to liens created before the decision, that tractors and
other such large equipment were not tools of the trade
eligible for the exemption, and that at the most only one
tractor would be eligible because only one tractor was
reasonably necessary for farming. The court held that Owen
would be applied retroactively and that the test for eligible
equipment was whether the equipment was normally used in
farming and not whether the equipment was reasonably
necessary for farming by the debtor. In re Nash, 142
B.R. 148 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992).
The debtors sought avoidance of judicial liens against
their homestead which they claimed as exempt under Ohio
Rev. Code § 2329.66(A)(1). The court held that under the
Ohio exemption, the exemption was allowed only as against
"execution, garnishment, attachment or sale" and thus did
not provide any exemption in a bankruptcy case.  Therefore,
no exemption was impaired by the judicial liens and the
liens could not be avoided. In re Bursee, 142 B.R. 167
(Bankr. N.D.  Ohio 1992). However, another Ohio
Bankruptcy Court held that a judicial lien on a homestead
was avoidable because the restriction on the exemption to
"execution, garnishment, attachment or sale" was an
impermissable limitation on the federal avoidance right. I
re Moreland, 142 B.R. 221 (Bankr.  S .D.  Ohio
1992).
The debtor had listed "household goods" in the list of
exemptions which was not objected to by a creditor with a
nonpurchase money, nonpossessory security interest in the
debtor's household goods. The debtor sought to avoid the
lien as to the exempt property. The court held that the
allowance of the exemption resulting from a lack of
objection did not affect the lien avoidance ability of the
debtor; however, because the debtor did not specifically
itemize the claimed exempt property, the court held that
avoidance of the lien was not possible because the court
could not determine what property was eligible for an
exemption. In re Mohr ing,  142 B.R.  389 (Bankr.
E.D. Cal. 1992).
HOMESTEAD. The debtors claimed an exemption for
their homestead, listed the value of the homestead as
$415,000, and claimed that the homestead was excluded from
the estate because the trustee failed to object to the
exemption and valuation within 30 days and the value of the
homestead was less than the encumbrances plus the
exemption plus the costs of selling the home.  The debtors
also argued that any post-petition appreciation of the
homestead above $415,000 was not estate property.  The
court held that the costs of selling the home could not be
considered in determining whether any value exists for the
estate, the trustee may object to the valuation, but not the
existence, of the homestead after the 30 day period and post-
petition appreciation of the homestead was estate property.
In re Hyman,  967 F .2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1992),
aff'g, 123 B.R. 342 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991).
IRA. The debtor's interest in an IRA was held not to be
exempt because the fund was not necessary for the support of
the debtor. The debtor was a divorced 34 year old radiologist
with two children. In re Smith, 142 B.R. 334
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992).
The court held that the debtor's interest in an IRA was
eligible for the federal exemption under Section
522(d)(10)(E) as a "pension, profit-sharing, annuity or
similar plan or contract." In re  Ch iz ,  142  B .R .  592
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1991).
LIFE INSURANCE. The debtor was the surviving
spouse of a person who had five life insurance policies, all
of wh ch named the surviving spouse as beneficiary; two had
been assigned to the surviving spouse by the decedent, two
were owned by the decedent and one was owned by the
decedent's corporation. The court held that under N.Y. Ins.
Law § 3212(b), the proceeds of the policies assigned to the
surviving spouse were exempt but the other policies were
not exempt. In re Rundlett,  142 B.R. 649 (Bankr.
S.D.  N.Y.  1992).
TRACTOR. The debtors claimed a farm tractor as
exempt under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(2) as a motor vehicle and
sought avoidance of a nonpurchase money, nonpossessory
security in the tractor as a tool of the trade. The court held
that the tractor was eligible for the motor vehicle exemption
and was eligible for the lien avoidance as a tool of the trade.
In re Branas, 143 B.R. 64 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1992).
PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS . More than one
year before filing for bankruptcy, the debtor borrowed money
from a bank and granted a security interest in the debtor's
property to secure the loan. Within one year before the
p tition, the debtor authorized the bank to offset funds in the
debtor's ccount against the loan balance. The bankruptcy
t u tee sought avoidance of that transfer as preferential. The
court held that the transfer was not avoidable because the
debtor received equivalent value for the transfer in the form
of the reduction of the loan balance.  The court also held that
the trustee could not challenge the legality of the original
loan as fraudulent in order to avoid the loan payment.
Matter of Loyal Cheese Co., Inc., 969 F.2d 515
(7th Cir. 1992).
   CHAPTER 11   
PLAN . The debtors' plan provided for the purchase of
farm land obtained by a creditor in a related bankruptcy case,
abandonment of other property to the creditor, and
contribution of money into the farm business from
additional l ans from new creditors. The creditor which
owned the land objected to the plan as not authorized by 11
U.S.C. § 363 and as unfair in that the creditor would have
the risk of depreciation on the abandoned property. The court
ruled that Section 363 did not give the debtor any right to
purchase property from a creditor against the creditor's
wishes and that the absolute priority rule exception was not
satisfied where the additional capital contributed to the
bu iness was borrowed. In re Bat ten ,  141 B .R .  899
(Bankr. W.D. La. 1992).
   CHAPTER 12   
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DISMISSAL . A Chapter 12 trustee had sought an
accounting from the debtor-in-possession because the trustee
had not received any information about the debtor's conduct
of the farming business post-petition.  The debtor then
sought dismissal of the case, stating that most debts had
been renegotiated. The court held that the debtor would be
required to file the accounting before dismissal of the case
after the trustee had time to examine the accounting for any
fraud. In re Goza, 142 B.R. 766 (Bankr. S .D.
Miss. 1992).
PLAN . The Chapter 12 plan provided for payment of a
secured claim over 40 years but made no mention of
payment of post-petition, pre-confirmation i terest or
attorney's fees. The creditor applied some of the first plan
payments to post-petition, pre-confirmation i terest and
attorney's fees and the debtor objected. The court held that
the secured creditor was entitled, under Section 506(b) to
post-petition, pre-confirmation interest and attorney's fees on
its claim whether or not such amounts were listed in the
confirmed plan. I  re Conrad, 142 B.R. 314 (Bankr.
E.D. Ark. 1992).
TRUSTEE FEES . The Chapter 12 debtor's plan
provided for direct payments to three impaired creditors, the
FmHA, Farm Credit Services and Farm Credit Bank of
Spokane. The trustee objected to these payments and loss of
trustee fees therefrom. The trustee acknowledged that the
additional fees would make the debtor's plan unfeasible. The
impaired creditors did not object to the plan. The court held
that the direct payments would be allowed because of the
sophistication of the creditors, the lack of objection by the
creditors and the remedies available to these creditors under
the plan in case of default. In re Teigen, 142 B.R. 397
(Bankr. D. Mont. 1992).
   CHAPTER 13   
PLAN . The debtor's plan proposed to pay to an ERISA
plan 100 percent of an amount borrowed from the debtor's
interest in the plan by the debtor, while paying other
unsecured creditors only 17 percent of their claims. The court
held that the plan could not be confirmed over the objection
of an unsecured creditor because the debtor would not be
paying all disposable income to unsecured creditors. The
court treated the payments to the ERISA plan as payments
to the debtor. In re Sco t t ,  142  B .R .  126 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1992).
The debtor's plan included payments to the debtor's
pension plan and only 10 percent on unsecured claims. The
court held that the plan was not confirmable bec usthe
pension plan payments were disposable income required to
be paid to the unsecured creditors. In re Fountain,  142
B.R. 135 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992).
VALUATION . The debtor owned a pickup truck for
personal use subject to a security interest held by a bank.
The court held that the value of the truck, for purposes of
determining the amount of the secured claim of the bank,
was the wholesale value of the truck where the truck was not
used in the debtor's business. I  re Goldner, 142 B.R.
926 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1992).
   FEDERAL TAXATION   
ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE . Under the debtors'
Chapter 11 plan, the debtors proposed to contribute $20,000
of machinery to the farm business and $30,000 cash from a
gift from a third party. The Bankruptcy Court had held that
the debtors' contributions were not substantial enough to
apply the absolute priority rule to allow the debtors to retain
an interest in the business while paying unsecured creditors
less han the full amount of their claims. The appellate court
refused to decide whether the absolute priority rule survived
enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Act and affirmed the
lower court's decision, based on a comparison of the
contribution to the amount of unpaid unsecured debt. In re
Snyder, 967 F.2d 1126 (7th Cir. 1992),  aff'g
u rep. D. Ct.  dec. aff 'g,  105 B.R.  898 (Bankr .
C.D. I l l .  1989).
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES. While the
debtor's case was still in Chapter 11, the debtor obtained
approval for loans from a creditor in exchange for
sup rpriori y of that creditor in the funds. The funds were
used to keep the debtor's businesses going so that they could
be old as going concerns. During this period, the businesses
incurred additional employment tax liability which was not
paid. After the case was converted to Chapter 7, the IRS filed
a claim for the employment taxes, interest and penalties and
sought priority under Section 506(c) as to the borrowed
funds because the nonpayment of the taxes helped preserve
the businesses. The court held that the IRS was entitled to
priority as to the unpaid taxes but not as to the interest and
penalties. U.S. v.  The Merchants Bank, 142 B.R.
889 (W.D. Mo. 1992).
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS . In 1988, the debtor
was assessed tax penalties and the debtor paid a portion of
the penalties and filed for a refund. The debtor challenged the
enial of the refund to the District Court and was denied. The
debtor then filed for Chapter 11 and sought recovery of the
partial payment as an avoidable preferential transfer made
within 90 days before the petition. The court held that the
effective date of the payment was when it was made and not
the da e of the final determination of the appeal by the
District Court; therefore, the payment was not made within
90 days before the petition and was not avoidable. In re
Nielsen, 143 B.R. 93 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992).
AUTOMATIC STAY . After the debtor filed for
Chapter 13 and the IRS had filed a claim for taxes owed by
the debtor and nondebtor spouse, the IRS seized the income
tax refund from their joint return and applied it to taxes owed
by the nondebtor spouse. Th  debtor filed a show cause
motion for violation of the automatic stay, but the IRS filed
a lien against the debtor's and nondebtor's property.
Although the debtor again filed a show cause motion for the
s cond vi lation, the IRS seized a later income tax refund
from a joint return and applied it to the nondebtor's income
tax deficiency. The IRS was held to have willfully violated
the automatic stay and was required to repay he debtor's
share of the seized property and pay the debtor's attorney and
court costs.  The court held that because the IRS had filed a
claim in the case involving the taxes affected by the seizures
and liens, 11 U.S.C. § 106(c) applied to waive the
governmental immunity for monetary claims. The court
also held that I.R.C. § 7430 did not apply in cases involving
violation of the automatic stay. Taborski  v.  U.S. ,  141
B.R. 959 (N.D. I l l .  1992). The same result was
obtained in another case where the IRS made post-
confirmation levies against the debtor's and nondebtor's bank
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accounts.  The debtor was not allowed punitive damages,
however. In re K idd,  142 B.R.  238 (Bankr .  S .D.
Ohio 1992).
During the period of the debtor's Chapter 11 plan, the
IRS informed the debtor that additional employment taxes
would be assessed such that after payment of the taxes in the
plan, the debtor would still owe an additional amount.  The
IRS also filed a notice of levy and a notice of a federal tax
lien.  The debtor sought sanctions against he IRS for
violation of the automatic stay. The court held that the
additional employment taxes were not discharged by the
bankruptcy case and that the debtor would remain liable for
the taxes outside of bankruptcy.  The court also held that the
lien notice did not violate the automatic stay because the lien
merely extended liens which would have otherwise
automatically been released.  The court refused to issue any
sanctions for the notice of levy because no property was
actually seized. In re Stuber, 142 B.R. 435 (Bankr.
D. Kan. 1992).
After the confirmation of the debtor's Chapter 13 plan,
the IRS sought relief from the automatic stay to levy for
unpaid taxes. The court held that after the confirmation of a
Chapter 13 plan, only the money and property paid to the
trustee in accordance with the plan were estate property
subject to the automatic stay and allowed the levy against
any property held by the debtor and not paid to the trustee.
In re Thompson, 142 B.R. 961 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1992).
After the debtor filed for Chapter 7 and notified the IRS
of the petition, the IRS made several evies against he
debtor's wages and property, although no funds were actually
paid to the IRS. The court held that because the IRS had not
filed a claim in the case, Section 106(c) did not waive the
IRS's governmental immunity in an action for monetary
damages. In re Nichols, 143 B.R. 104 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1992).
BAD DEBT DEDUCTION. Because of the officers
and shareholder's fraudulent lending practices, the date when
the debtor corporation's bad debts became worthless was
unknowable.  The IRS claim for unpaid taxes determined the
bad debt deduction based on the accrual method because the
date when the debts became worthless was unknown. The
bankruptcy trustee sought use of the cash method, arguing
that the burden was on the IRS to prove when the debts
became worthless. The court held that the method of
claiming the bad debt deduction was not affected by a
bankruptcy proceeding and that where the date of
worthlessness was unknown, the accrual method of claiming
the deduction was to be used. In re Landbank Equity
Corp.  v.  Levy, 92-2 U.S .  Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,464 (4th Cir. 1992).
CLAIMS .  The IRS filed a timely claim for $365 for
interest on the debtors' late payment of 1984 taxes.  During
the bankruptcy case and two months before the claims bar
date, the debtors filed an amended 1984 return showing an
additional $1.6 million tax liability; however, the IRS did
not file a claim for these taxes until six months after the
claims bar date.  The court held t at the claim was not
allowed because the claim did not relate to the timely filed
claim for interest and the IRS did not provide evidence of a
reason for its failure to timely file the claim other than an
overburdened claims office staff.  In re Norris Grain
Co. ,  969 F.2d 1047 (11th Cir. 1992),  aff'g
without pub. op.,  131 B.R. 747 (M.D. Fla.
1990),  aff'g,  81 B.R. 103 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1987).
DISCHARGE . The debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition
n April 15, 1991 and sought discharge of 1987 and 1988
federal income taxes. The court held that the taxes for 1987
but not 1988 were dischargeable because the tax return was
not due after three years before the filing of the petition. In
re Luke, 142 B.R. 160 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1992).
The debtors made several pre-petition gift transfers of
property for which no federal gift tax return was filed or gift
tax paid. The debtors listed the claims as disputed on their
schedules but the IRS filed no claim for the gift taxes in the
case. The debtor's confirmed plan made no provision for
payment of the gift taxes and the plan was consummated.
The debtors filed an objection to the IRS post-confirmation
assessment of the gift taxes as barred by the confirmation of
th  plan. The court held that the confirmation order had no
effect on the dischargeability of the gift taxes which were not
dischargeable under Section 523(a)(1) because no return was
filed. In re Grynberg, 142 B.R. 415 (D. Colo.
1991).
The court held that the determination of the
dischargeability of the debtor's liability for tax deficiency
should have been made using the  "preponderance" standard
of proof used in Grogan v. Garner, 111 S. Ct. 654 (1991).
The retroactive application of Grogan was required because
th bankruptcy case was pending when Grogan was decided.
In re Graham, 92-2 U.S .  Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,447 (3d Cir. 1992),  vac'g and rem'g, 131
B.R.  275 (E.D.  Pa.  1991),  aff'g,  108  B .R .  498
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989).
The court found that the debtor had not filed returns for
1981, 1982 and 1983 but had filed amended returns for those
years in 1986 after the IRS had made an assessment for the
unpaid taxes due for those years. The court held tha t
amen ed returns were not returns for purposes of Section
523( )(1)(B)(i) so as to make the taxes for those years
dischargeable. Arenson v. U.S., 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,466 (D. Neb. 1992).
The IRS assessed income tax deficiencies against he
debtor in 1978 for failure to report amounts embezzled by
the debtor in income. The debtor reached a settlement with
the IRS which included an agreement by the IRS not to seek
fraud pe alties.  The IRS sought nondischargeability of the
unpaid deficiencies because of fraudulent returns. The court
held that the IRS was not estopped by the settlement from
asserting fraud in the bankruptcy case. Levinson v.
U.S., 969 F.2d 260 (7th Cir.  1992).
JURISDICTION . The debtor corporation sought to
enjoin the IRS from seeking collection of the I.R.C. § 6672
penalty ag inst he debtor's officers and shareholders as
responsible persons for failure of the corporation to pay
employm nt withholding taxes. The court held that the court
was prohibited by the Anti-Injunction Act where the
njunction involved nondebtors. In re Davidson's of
Pikevi l le,  Inc. ,  142 B.R. 789 (Bankr.  E.D. Ky.
1992).
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The IRS had levied on the debtor's interest in an ERISA
qualified pension plan which the debtor had claimed as
exempt. The plan administrator sought bankruptcy court
guidance as to whom the debtor's interest should be paid.
The court held that once the debtor's interest was found to be
exempt, the bankruptcy court was without jurisdic ion to
determine the debtor's liability for payment of taxes with the
funds from the plan because the property was no longer in
the bankruptcy estate. In re Lewis,  142 B.R.  952 (D.
Colo. 1992).
PLAN . In the confirmation order, the court ruled that
the principal purpose of the corporate debtor's reorganization
plan was not tax avoidance. Under the plan, the debtor carried
over net operating losses and distributed stock to
shareholders and creditors in satisfaction of some claims. The
IRS subsequently issued final regulations under I.R.C. § 269
prohibiting the use of net operating losses by certain
reorganized corporations if the principal purpose of the
reorganization was tax avoidance. The debtor sought a ruling
that the confirmation order precluded the IRS from
prohibiting the debtor from using its carryover net operating
losses. The court held that the confirmation order did not
have preclusive effect as to tax issues which arose post-
confirmation. In re Hartman Material Handling
Systems, Inc. ,  141 B.R.  802 (Bankr.  S.D. N.Y.
1992).
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY . The debtor sought to
recover as avoidable preference payments, non-trust fund tax
payments made within 90 days before the bankruptcy filing.
The IRS argued that the action was barred by sovereign
immunity.  The court held that the preference action was a
compulsory counterclaim to the IRS claim for taxes and that
the IRS sovereign immunity was waived by 11 U.S.C. §
106(c). In re Pullman Const. Indus., Inc., 142
B.R. 280 (Bankr. N.D. I l l .  1992).
CONTRACTS
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE . The defendant contracted
with the defendant to raise turkeys provided by the defendant.
Under the contract, the defendant was to provide "a
maximum of 32 flocks consisting of a total of 300,000
young turkeys in each 12 month period." The plaintiff
argued that the provision required the defendant to provide at
least that many turkeys each year and the failure of the
defendant to provide that amount caused the failure of the
plaintiff's business, the loss of the business property and
loss of profits. The defendant argued that the provision
allowed it discretion as to how many birds to provide each
year. The court ruled that the provision was ambiguous and
allowed extrinsic evidence of the conduct of the parties. The
contract also provided for an amount to be paid by the
defendant if the contract was terminated early, in recognition
that an early termination would jeopardize the plaintiff's
ability to pay off loans incurred to build the facilities used to
raise the turkeys. The court held that because the defendant
failed to make this payment, the plaintiff was entitled to
damages for lost profits for the period after the contract was
terminated. Superbird Farms, Inc. v. Perdue Farms,




ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS . The ASCS has
is ued proposed regulations amending the administrative
review process to provide for procedures for filing requests
for administrative r view of adverse determinations by
county committees, the Deputy Administrator and the
Nation l Appeals Division. 57 Fed. Reg. 43937
(Sept. 23, 1992).
ALIEN AGRICULTURAL LABOR . The
Secretaries of Agriculture and Labor have determined that no
additional aliens should be admitted to the United States or
should otherwise acquire the status of aliens lawfully
admitted for temporary residence under Section 210A of the
Immigration and Nationality Act to meet a shortage of
worke s to perform seasonal agricultural services during
fiscal year 1993. 57 Fed. Reg. 45370 (Oct. 1 ,
1992).
The plaintiffs were alien agricultural workers hired under
the H-2 program which required a minimum hourly wage.
The hourly wage was annually adjusted and the regulations
required employers to adjust the piece rate wage such that the
average worker would earn the minimum hourly wage. The
workers successfully challenged a 1978 interpretation which
would allow the piece rate adjustment to be based on a
previous year's average worker's production. In 1985,the
USDA required by contract employers to base their piece rate
on the current year productivity but the growers filed separate
letters of protest, claiming that they were entitled to base the
adjustment on the average productivity of workersin the
previous year. The court held that the employers were not
entitled to challenge the regulation because they agreed by
contract to provide the higher piece rate. Frederick
County Fruit Growers v. Martin, 968 F.2d 1265
(D.C. Cir. 1992).
BORROWER'S RIGHTS . The FmHA held a first
mortgage on farm property owned by the debtors and leased
to third parties. After the debtors defaulted on their loan, the
FmHA sent the debtors notice of loan servicing options but
received no response. After the debtors filed Chapter 12
bankruptcy, the FmHA sent the debtor's counsel a letter
providing possible loan servicing options. After again
receiving no response, the FmHA agreed to allow the trustee
to sell the farm free and clear of liens. The debtors argued
that the letter to their counsel violated the automatic stay and
that the agreement to allow the trustee to sell the property
violated the debtors' right of first refusal under the
Agricultural Credit Act. The court held that the letter did not
violate the automatic stay because the letter made no effort
to enforce or collect upon an obligation but merely informed
the debtors of their rights. The court also held that the
FmHA agreement to sell the farm did not violate the debtor's
rights because the debtors had lost those rights by choosing
bankruptcy over loan restructuring. U.S. v.  Nelson, 969
F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1992), aff'g in part and rev'g
in part an unrep. D. Ct. dec. aff'g,  123 B.R.  993
(Bankr. D. S.D. 1990).
CROP INSURANCE . The FCIC has announced that
the date for accepting applications for wheat, barley, rye, oat,
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potato and nursery crop insurance for the 1993 crop year has
been extended to October 31, 1992. 57 Fed. Reg.
44967-44969 (Sept. 30, 1992).
GUARANTEED LOANS . The FmHA has issued
final regulations providing procedures for guaranteeing loans
to businesses impacted by natural disasters such as Hurricane
Andrew and for injuries caused by microbursts of wind. 57
Fed. Reg. 45968 (Oct. 5, 1992).
HERBICIDES . The plaintiff grain farmer applied the
herbicide Scepter, a herbicide registered with the EPA, to a
crop of soybeans.  Eleven months later, as provided by the
instructions, the plaintiff planted corn on the same acres but
the corn was damaged by the carryover effect of the herbicide.
The plaintiff sued the manufacturer for failure to adequately
test the product, for failure to properly formulate the product,
for failing to manufacture the product in conformity with its
specifications, for selling the product with an inaccurate
label, and for failing to warn that it was unsafe to plant corn
11 months after application of the product. The manufacturer
argued that FIFRA preempted the suit. The court held that
FIFRA preempted state tort actions only insofar as the tort
duty involved would require labeling in addition to or
different from the federal labeling requirements of FIFRA
such that in order for the manufacturer to comply with the
state tort duty, the manufacturer would have to violate
FIFRA. The case was remanded for consideration of the
plaintiff's claims based on this standard. Worm v.
American Cyanamid Co. ,  970 F.2d 1301 (4th
Cir. 1992).
MEAT AND POULTRY INSPECTION . The
FSIS has adopted as final regulations permitting the use of
ionizing radiation to treat fresh or frozen uncooked poultry
carcasses or parts. 57 Fed.  Reg.  43588 (Sept. 21,
1992).
NATIONAL FORESTS. The Forest Service has
adopted as final revisions to its policies and procedures for
implementing the National Environmental Policy Act and
Council on Environmental Quality regulations. 57 Fed.
Reg. 43180 (Sept. 18, 1992).
PESTICIDES . The EPA has published in their
entirety the comments of the USDA regarding the final
regulations for the Worker Protection Standard for
Agricultural Pesticides.  See p. 157 supra. 57 Fed. Reg.
42472 (Sept. 14, 1992).
TOBACCO . The ASCS has announced that the 1992
marketing quota for flue-cured tobacco is 891.8 million
pounds and the price support level is $1.56 per pound. 57
Fed. Reg. 43176 (Sept. 18, 1992).
The CCC has announced that the 1992 marketing quota
for burley tobacco is 670.0 million pounds and the price
support level is $1.649 per pound. 57 Fed. Reg. 43178
(Sept. 18, 1992).
The CCC has adopted as final regulations involving the
enforcement of the price support program for tobacco. 57
Fed. Reg. 43580 (Sept. 21, 1992).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION . Under the decedent's
will property passed to a charitable organization subject to
use conditions and sale restrictions. The estate was allowed a
charitable deduction for the fair market value of the property.
After the limitation period expired for assessment of estate
tax, the property was reconveyed to the estate because the
organiz tion failed to comply with the use conditions. The
IRS noted that the initial charitable deduction should ot
have been allowed unless the chance that the conditions on
the transfer would occur was "so remote as to be negligible."
However, because the reconveyance was in furtherance of the
devise to the remainder holders under the will, the estate was
not requir d to include the fair market value of the
reconveyed property in gross income. Ltr. Rul.
9236003, May 22, 1992.
DISCLAIMERS . Under the decedent's will, property
passed to he decedent's three children who were directors of a
priva efoundation established by the decedent. The will
provided that if the children disclaimed any bequest, the
property passed to a charity selected by the disclaimant's
spouse. If the charity selected is the private foundation, the
property was to be held in a separate fund administered by
directors other than the disclaimant. The IRS ruled that any
disclaimed property passing to the private foundation was
eligible for the charitable deduction. Ltr.  Rul.  9235022,
May 29, 1992.
The decedent's executor filed a disclaimer of the decedent's
interest in a predeceased spouse's estate more than nine
months after the spouse died but less than nine months after
the spouse's will was admitted to probate. The court held
that the disclaimer was not effective because the nine month
period of I.R.C. § 2518 began on the predeceased spouse's
death. Est. of Fleming v. Comm'r, 92-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,113 (7th Cir. 1992).
At the death of the spouse, the surviving spouse received
a life interest in a trust with unlimited power to withdraw
corpus and a remainder to the decedent's son. The surviving
spouse executed a disclaimer of a portion of the interest in
the rust sufficient to decrease the decedent's taxable estate to
$500,000 and elected to decrease the disclaimed amount by
the administrative expenses which were taken as an estate
income tax deduction. The court held that the disclaimed
amount could be decreased by the administrative expenses
because the disclaimer was made in terms of a formula based
on reducing the taxable estate. Est. of McInnes v.
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1992-558.
A portion of an intervivos trust passed to the decedent's
daughter on the decedent's death with the daughter having the
wer to appoint any of the principal to herself, her estate or
anyone else. The daughter was also to serve as trustee. The
daughter disclaimed the right to appoint a portion of the trust
corpus and the right to serve as trustee with the result that
the disclaimed portion of the trust would pass to the
daughter's i sue on her death. The IRS ruled that the
disclaimer was effective for the fractional share of the trust
su h that the fractional share would not be included in the
daughter's gross estate. The IRS also ruled that the passing
of the trust property to the daughter's issue would be a direct
skip subject to GSTT and that the GSTT exemption amount
would be allocated to that property using the fraction equal
to the ratio of the value of the property disclaimed to the
value of the entire trust property. Ltr .  Rul .  9236018,
June 5, 1992.
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GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX .
The taxpayer was the beneficiary of a life interest in a trust
created by the taxpayer's parent in 1955 and which granted
each beneficiary a testamentary power to appoint the interest
to a descendant. The taxpayer executed a will which
appointed the trust interest to the taxpayer's grandchildren in
trust with the trust to terminate not later than 21 years after
the death of the last of the taxpayer's children living at the
death of the grantor of the taxpayer's trust interest. The IRS
ruled that the trusts for the taxpayer's grandchildren would
not be subject to GSTT. Ltr.  Rul.  9235030, May 29,
1992.
The taxpayer was the beneficiary of a life interest in a
trust created by the taxpayer's parent in 1973 and which
granted the taxpayer a power to appoint one-half of the
interest to anyone other than the taxpayer, the taxpayer's
estate or the taxpayer's creditors. The taxpayer appointed one-
half of the trust property to another irrevocable trust for the
taxpayer's life with a remainder to the taxpayer's issue. The
irrevocable trust was required to terminate within 21 years
after the death of persons living at the death of the taxpayer's
parent. The IRS ruled that the original trust was not subject
to GSTT nor was the trust created by the exercise of the
special power of appointment. Ltr. Rul.  9236029,
June 9, 1992.
GROSS ESTATE. The decedent was a co-trustee and
life beneficiary of a trust established by a predeceased parent.
The decedent was also co-trustee of a trust for the decedent's
sister. Each trust allowed the trustees to distribute trust
corpus for the beneficiary's "support, maintenance, comfort,
emergencies and serious illness," but the distributee co-
trustee could not participate in th  decision to make the
distribution. The IRS ruled that because the distribution of
corpus was not subject to an ascertainable standard and
because the co-trustees had reciprocal powers, the decedent's
interest in the trust was includible in the decedent's gross
estate. Ltr. Rul. 9235025, May 29, 1992.
INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF ESTATE
TAX . The decedent's estate elected installment payment of
estate tax under I.R.C. § 6166. The estate included stock in
two corporations which passed to one heir. The heir
transferred the stock in exchange for stock in a new
corporation which would redeem the shares as necessary to
pay the estate tax installments. The IRS ruled that the
redemptions would not be considered ispositions of the
heir's interest in the stock to cause acceleration of the
installment payments. L r  Rul .  9238029,  June 22,
1992.
JOINT PROPERTY .  The decedent and surviving
spouse purchased real property in joint tenancy in 1955 with
funds earned solely by the decedent.  The decedent's estate
claimed the entire real property in the decedent's estate and
the surviving spouse used the estate property value as a basis
for determining gain on the sale of the property.  The court
held that the entire property was includible in the decedent's
gross estate because Section 2040(b) as added in 1976 was
not amended by ERTA 1981 for estates where the joint
interest was created prior to the 1976 amendment.
Gallenstein v.  U.S.,  92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
¶ 60,114 (6th Cir .  1992),  af f 'g ,  91-2 U.S.  Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,088 (E.D. Ky. 1991).
LIFE INSURANCE . The taxpayer was a shareholder
of a co poration which owned life insurance polices on the
life of the taxpayer. The corporation sold the policies to an
irrevocable trust for their fair market value. One beneficiary
of the trust was the son of the taxpayer and the trust, son and
taxpayer were all partners of a pre-existing partnership. The
IRS ruled that because the sale of the life insurance policies
was to a partner of the the taxpayer, the proceeds of the
policies at the death of the taxpayer would not be included in
g oss income. Ltr. Rul. 9235029, May 29, 1992.
MARITAL DEDUCTION . The decedent's will
bequeathed estate property to the surviving spouse in an
amount, fter deductions, necessary to reduce the estate tax to
zero.  The estate incurred $26,000 in attorney's fees and the
surviving spouse as executrix elected to claim $13,000 of
the fees on the estate's income tax return and $13,000 as an
esta  tax deduction. Although the court found that the will
wasunclear as to whether income tax deductions were
intended to reduce the marital bequest, the court held that
under state law, the surviving spouse as executrix had
sufficient discretion to allocate the expense such that the
marital bequest was not affected; therefore, the income tax
deduction did not decrease the marital bequest. Est. of
Young v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1992-551.
The decedent's will bequeathed property in trust to the
surviving spouse. Under the trust, all trust income was to be
distribut d at least quarterly and the trustee had the power to
distribute rust corpus to the spouse. The trust also provided
that the trustee had unlimited power to hold, manage, invest
or reinvest trust property. The IRS ruled that because the
trustee would be subject to the "prudent man standard" in
investing trust property to prevent investment in
nonproductive property, the trustwas QTIP. Ltr. Rul.
9237009, May 21, 1992.
SALE OF ESTATE PROPERTY . Under the
decedent'  will, an heir had the option to receive art work in
the estate up to the value of one-half of the residuary estate
or the proceeds of the sale of the art work equal to one-half
of the residuary estate. The heir elected the second option and
the estate sold the art work at an auction in which the
auction house received a premium of 10 percent of the bid
price from the buyer of each piece. The estate argued that the
fair market value of the art work was equal to the bid price
and did not include the premium paid by the buyer which
was paid to the auction house. The estate also argued that if
the premium was included in the fair market value of each
piece, the premium was deductible as an administrative
expense.  The IRS ruled that because the total amount paid
was used by the art industry to determine value and was
listed as t e price of auctioned art work, the fair market value
of he art work included the premium.  The IRS also ruled
that bec use the sale of the art work was done to facilitate
the option elected by the heir, the premium paid to the
auction house was not an administrative expense except to
th  ext t the estate could demonstrate tha  the sale was
made in order to pay other estate administrative expenses.
Ltr. Rul. 9235005, May 27, 1992.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION . Prior to death, the
decedent's farm was crop share leased to a grandson. The farm
was bequeathed to a son of the decedent, an uncle of the
grandson. The uncle elected special use valuation of the farm
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and continued the lease of the farm to the nephew but on a
cash lease basis. The uncle argued that the cash lease of the
farm did not amount to a cessation of qualified use because a
family member continued to farm the property.  In the
alternative, the uncle argued that the lease was a disposition
of the farm to a qualified heir. The court held that the
qualified use test was determined based on the qualified heir's
use of the property and a cash lease was not a qualified use.
The court also held that the lease of the property was not a
disposition sufficient to make the nephew a qualified heir.
Williamson v .  Comm'r, 92-2 U.S .  Tax Cas.




COOPERATIVES . A nonexempt agricultural
cooperative ntered into a marketing arrangement with a
corporation for the processing and marketing of raw
agricultural products produced by the cooperative's members.
The cooperative provided financing for the corporation by
direct contribution of capital and relending of borrowed funds
to the corporation. The corporation also made payments to
the cooperative under a licensing agreement. The IRS ruled
that all of the payments to the cooperative were patronage
sourced income because the payments were closely related to
the cooperative's need for the corporation's processing and
marketing services. Ltr. Rul.  9236001, May 20,
1992.
The taxpayer was an agricultural products marketing
cooperative which was a defendant in a civil antitrust
lawsuit. The taxpayer reached an out-of-court settlement in
which it paid cash and a promissory note to the plaintiff.
The lawsuit involved the taxpayer's marketing activities
directly related to patronage sourced income. The IRS ruled
that the payments under the settlement were patronage
sourced expenses for purposes of determining net patronage
source earnings for allocating patronage dividends. Ltr.
Rul. 9238010, June 16, 1992.
ELECTIONS . The IRS has redesignated the citations
of the treasury regulations governing taxpayer elections
under TAMRA 1988. 57 Fed. Reg. (1992).
EMPLOYEE . The taxpayer operated a forestry service
business which included the planting and pruning of pine
trees for a client on a contract basis. The taxpayer used crews
of full time workers to do the planting and pruning. The
taxpayer provided supervision as to how the trees were to be
planted and pruned and required specific work starting times.
The workers provided their own equipment which cost less
than $100 and was not a significant investment in the
business. The workers were paid on a weekly basis and could
quit or be fired without liability. The IRS ruled that the
workers were employees ubject to FICA and FUTA
withholding. Ltr.  Rul.  9237001, Nov. 14, 1991.
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayer was allowed loss
deductions from a cattle-raising business. The court found
that the taxpayer had 20 year's experience in the cattle
business, invested substantial amounts of time in the
business, kept accurate records and investigated the profit
potential of the business before acquiring the business.
McGuire v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1992-542.
INSTALLMENT METHOD . The taxpayer owned a
corporation X which owned another corporation Y and two
subsidiaries. In 1981, the X corporation sold its Y stock to a
third corporation, W, wholly owned by the taxpayer's
daughter a d two trusts for the taxpayer's grandchildren. The
consideration for the stock was a 20-year promissory note
nd the sale was reported on the installment method. The
t xpayer also received a security interest in the Y corporation
stock, the stock of the two subsidiaries and any proceeds. In
1983, the daughter's corporation W and corporation Y and its
subsidiaries adopted plans of liquidation under which the Y
corporation distributed the proceeds of its assets to
corporation W and W distributed the proceeds of its assets to
the daughter and the trusts. The final distribution included
cash. Thus, the security for the installment sale of the Y
corporation stock was converted into other property
including cash. The IRS noted that the changes in the W and
Y corporations did not affect the installment method of
reporting the sale, nor did the mere change in the collateral
securing the sale. However, under Temp. Treas. Reg. §
15a.453-1(b)(3)(i), gain must be reported by the seller to the
extent the security for the installment sale is cash or cash
equivalent. Therefore, once the Y corporation stock was
liquidated into cash and cash equivalents, the taxpayer had to
report gain to the extent of the cas  or cash equivalents
securing the note. In addition, the IRS ruled that the entire
distribution of the Y corporation stock by the W corporation
to the daughter and trusts was a second distribution to a
related person but would not cause recognition of the entire
gain from the installment sale because the distribution by
the W corporation occurred more than two years after the
installment sale. The IRS noted that the two year rule could
be tolled if the W corporation's risk of loss was substantially
diminished. Ltr. Rul. 9238005, June 8, 1992.
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT . The taxpayer was
denied investment tax credit for leased equipment which was
leased to and used by the same business before and after the
purchase by the taxpayer. Schlang v.  Comm'r,  T.C.
Memo. 1992-515.
PARTNERSHIPS
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. The taxpayer
was a partner with the taxpayer's spouse in a business. The
spouse had declared bankruptcy and the IRS had issued a
deficiency notice to both parties disallowing some
partnership losses and credits. The nondebtor spouse argued
that the deficiency notice was defective because it involved
partnership items and the IRS did not comply with the
partnership administrative adjustment rules. The IRS argued
that the rules did not apply because one partner was in
bankruptcy. The court held that the bankruptcy rule did not
apply to the nondebtor partner and that the deficiency notice
was invalid as to the nondebtor partner for failure to comply
with the partnership administrative adjustment procedures.
Dubin v. Comm'r, 99 T.C. No. 17 (1992).
The IRS has sent a Final Partnership Administrative
Adjustment disallowing deductions made by the partners
because the partners were not at-risk as to partnership
liabilities for which the deductions were taken. The partners
argued that the "at-risk" determination was not a partnership
item subject to the FPAA procedures. The court held that
although the at-risk determination did involve a
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determination of the nature of the partnership liabilities
involved, the at-risk determination was not subject to the
FPAA procedure because the at-risk determination was not
an item used in preparation of the partnership return.
Hambrose Leasing 1984-5 v.  Comm'r,  99 T.C.
No. 15,  1992.
A tax matters partner had signed a consent for extension
of the period for assessments against the partnership after the
partner had resigned from the partnership. The court held that
the consent was effective against the partnership because the
partner had not resigned as tax matters partner and the
partnership had not designated a new tax matters partner prior
to the signing of the consent. Monetary II Limited
Partnership v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1992-562.
TRANSACTIONS. The IRS has adopted as final
regulations governing transactions between partners and
between partners and their partnership. 57 Fed. Reg.
44974 (Sept. 30, 1992).
PENSION PLANS . For plans beginning in
September 1992 the weighted average is 8.19 percent with
the permissible range of 7.37 to 9.01 percent for purposes of
determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C. §
412(c)(7).  Notice 92-42, I .R.B. 1992-39, 13.
RETURNS . The IRS has issued new Form 1120-
W(FY) Fiscal Year Corporation Estimated Tax for
corporations with axable years beginning after June 30,
1992 and before January 1, 1993. Ann. 92-130, I .R.B.
1992-38, 43.




AFR 3.85 3.81 3.79 3.78
110% AFR 4.23 4.19 4.17 4.15
120% AFR 4.62 4.57 4.54 4.53
Mid-term
AFR 5.78 5.70 5.66 5.63
110% AFR 6.37 6.27 6.22 6.19
120% AFR 6.96 6.84 6.78 6.74
Long-term
AFR 7.03 6.91 6.85 6.81
110% AFR 7.74 7.60 7.53 7.48
120% AFR 8.46 8.29 8.21 8.15
SAFE HARBOR LEASING . The taxpayer entered
into several safe harbor leasing agreements involving
segments of railroad track. The court held that each segment
was to be treated as a separate transaction and denied
depreciation deductions and investment tax credits for those
segments not placed in service in the required periods under
the safe harbor leasing rules. In addition, the deductions and
credits were denied because the property was not sufficiently
described in the leases. Armstrong World Indus., Inc.
v. Comm'r, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,461
(3d Cir. 1992), aff'g,  T.C. Memo. 1991-326.
S CORPORATIONS
ELECTION. A shareholder died on March 1, 1991, and
the corporation made the S corporation election on March
15, 1991 with all other shareholders consenting to the
election. The IRS ruled that the executor or administrator of
the deceased shareholder's estate could give the consent to the
election. Rev. Rul.  92-82, I .R.B. 1992-39, 10.
TRUSTS. The IRS has ruled that a trust which qualifies
as an individual retirement account under I.R.C. § 408(a)
cannot be a qualified Subchapter S trust. Rev.  Ru l .  92-
73, I .R.B. 1992-37, 7.
Under the decedent's will, shares of an S corporation
passed to two trusts which had the surviving spouse as
b neficiary. Under the trusts, the spouse was to receive all
income at least annually and the trustee had the discretion to
distribute trust corpus to the spouse for maintenance,
support and medical needs. The IRS ruled that the trusts were
qualified Subchapter S trusts. Ltr. Rul. 9236036, June
10, 1992.
TRUSTS. The taxpayer operated a dairyfarm which
was transferred by deed to a trust with the taxpayer's spouse
and daughter as trustees but no named beneficiary. The
taxpayer continued to operate the farm and received payments
and paid expenses in the taxpayer's name. No distributions to
beneficiaries were made and the trust filed fiduciary tax
returns but the taxpayer did not file personal income tax
returns.  T e taxpayer argued that the income tax deficiency
asses d should have been reduced by the expenses of the
farm. The taxpayer refused to testify about the dairy expenses
and income, claiming that the records were in the possession
of the trustees, but the taxpayer made no effort to obtain the
records for the Tax Court or IRS. The court held that the
trust was a sham and that the taxpayer was liable for tax on
all income of the trust. The court also held that the taxpayer
was not allowed deductions in addition to any discovered by
the IRS from third parties because the taxpayer failed to
provide any evidence of the deductions even though the
records were claimed to be held by the taxpayer's spouse and
daughter as trustees. Buelow v. Comm'r,  970 F.2d
412 (7th Cir. 1992).
WITHHOLDING TAXES . The IRS has adopted as
final regulations governing payment of payroll withholding
taxes.  The payments are to be made monthly for employers
who paid $50,000 or less during the previous July 1 to June
30 and for new employers. Employers who paid more than
$50,000 during that period will be required to make
payments semi-weekly. Exceptions include requiring
immediate payments when the withheld amount exceeds
$100,000 during a semi-weekly or monthly period.
Payments with respect to wages paid to farm workers are
based on the previous calendar year. The regulations are
effective for payments to be made after December 31, 1992,
with a one-year transition rule. 57 Fed. Reg. 44099
(Sept. 24, 1992).
The taxpayer was employed by a brokerage firm which
treated its brokers as independent contractors for purposes of
federal employment tax withholding. The IRS determined
that the brokers were employees subject to withholding and
entered into a settlement with the employer concerning the
amount owed by the employer. The taxpayer claimed a credit
for the amount of withholding taxes which should have
been, but were not, withheld by the employer. The court
held that the taxpayer could not claim credit for withholding
taxes which were not withheld and paid by the employer. In
re Eryurt, 142 B.R. 999 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1992).
NUISANCE
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COTTON GIN . The plaintiff purchased a rural home
in 1978 and the defendant built a cotton gin within 300 feet
of the plaintiff's home in 1980. The plaintiff suffered from
asthma and complained to the defendants and various
governmental agencies over the next 5 years about the dust
from the gin. The defendants modernized the gin in 1983 and
added pollution control devices in 1984 and 1985. The
plaintiff brought suit for damages and an injunction against
the gin as a private nuisance. The defendant asserted the one
year statute of limitations for nuisance actions against
agricultural operations as a defense to the action. The court
held that the gin was an agricultural operation within the
statute, Miss. Code § 95-3-29 and that no changes had been
made in the operation, except for an increase in the amount
of cotton ginned, sufficient to restart the one year limitation
period. Bowen v.  F laherty ,  601 S.2d 860 (Miss .
1992).
RACKETEERING
RICO . The plaintiffs were a Chapter 12 bankruptcy
debtor and the Chapter 12 trustee. The debtor had purchased
farm supplies from the defendant and had defaulted on the
credit account with the defendant who obtained a judgment
for the unpaid amount. The debtor settled the matter by
agreeing to pay some money immediately, to grant a
security interest in all of the debtor's property and to give a
promissory note bearing 2 percent monthly interest
compounded monthly. The note was to be paid from 50
percent of the proceeds of joint checks for the debtor's crops.
The defendant failed to pay the debtor 50 percent of the joint
checks and refused to allow a lien to be released so that the
debtor could sell some farm land at fair market value. After
the primary mortgage holder foreclosed on the debtor's land,
the defendant purchased the land at the foreclosure sale at
bargain prices. The debtor alleged that the actions of the
defendant violated the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act. The action was dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action except as to two specific allegations
of incidents of mail fraud and as to the allegation of a pattern
of future racketeering activity in that the defendant also
charged excessive interest to other delinquent accounts. In re
Bennett, 142 B.R. 616 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 1992).
INSURANCE
APPLES . The plaintiff was an apple grower who
suffered hail damage to an apple crop. The defendant's
adjuster sampled only apples from the lower portions of the
trees and submitted a damage claim based on that sample.
The plaintiff hired its own adjuster who reached a higher
damage amount by including apples from the tops of the
trees as well as apples from the sides of the trees. The court
held that evidence of the plaintiff's past yields and profits
was irrelevant as to the amount of insurable loss because the
insurable loss was based on percentage of crop loss and not
actual profits loss. The court also upheld the jury award of
damages for vexatious and unreasonable conduct by the
defendant because the evidence was sufficient to show that
the defendant purposefully useda less effective sampling
method and refused to negotiate with the plaintiff on the
method of determining the crop loss. Boyd v .  United
Farm Mut .  Reins .  Co. ,  596 N.E.2d 1344 (Il l .
Ct. App. 1992).
LANDLORD AND TENANT
REPAIRS . The tenant leased an old manufacturing
storage warehouse to store excess grain and beans on a
temporary basis. Under the lease, the tenant had
responsibility for repairs although the landlord agreed to and
did make some repairs to the roof. The tenant requested that
the fire sprinkler system be turned off and the landlord turned
off the system but did not drain the pipes.  After the tenant
disconnected the electricity to the sprinkler heating system,
the valves froze, causing water to leak onto the stored grain.
The tenant sued for damages to the grain from the leaky roof
and sprinkler system. The landlord sued for unpaid rent after
the tenant failed to vacate the premises until 8 months after
termination of the lease. The court held that the landlord was
not liable for the water damage from the leaky roof because
the tenant had the responsibility for repairs. The court also
held that the landlord had assumed the duty to properly turn
off the sprinkler system and was liable for that damage.  The
tenant was held liable for the unpaid rent on the holdover
period. A.O. Smith Corp. v. Kaufman Grain Co.,
596 N.E.2d 1156 (I l l .  Ct. App. 1992).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
MILKING SYSTEM .  The owners of a dairy farm
sued the installer and designer of a milking system for breach
of implied and express warranty and negligence for injury to
dairy cows and lost profits.  The action was filed more than
four years but less than six years after delivery of the
system.  The court held that the four year statute of
limitations of the UCC, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 19.2725,
applied because the action was one for economic loss
between a buyer and seller of business products.  Although
the contract was for goods and services, the court followed
the test set forth in Bo ebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951 (8th
Cir. 1974) and held that because the contract was
predominantly one for goods, the UCC statute of limitations
applied.  Neibarger v. Universal Cooperatives, 486
N.W.2d 612 (Mich. 1992), aff'g,  450 N.W.2d 88
(Mich. App. 1989).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
FEDERAL FARM PRODUCTS RULE . The
Packers and Stockyards Administration has certified the
Colorado central filing system for most farm products. 57





FILING . The debtor granted a security interest in a
farm tractor to the creditor who filed the financing statement
in the county of the debtor's business on October 2, 1989.
Effective October 1, 1989, Florida law changed to require
filing of all financing statements with the Secretary of
State. The court held that the security interest was
unperfected because it was filed in the wrong place. I  re
Walker, 142 B.R. 484 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992).
PERFECTION . A partnership which operated a dairy
granted security interests in partnership farm and dairy
equipment to a creditor. Although the security agreement
was properly executed, the financing statement lis d the
three partners individually as the debtors and not the
partnership. The financing statement was signed by the
three partners over the words "d/b/a Walker Brothers Dairy."
The court held that the security interest was not perfected
because the financing statement did not correctly identify the
debtor as the partnership. In re Walker, 142 B.R. 482
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992).
STATE TAXATION
AGRICULTURAL USE . The taxpayer operated a
greenhouse for the production and sale of ornamental plants
on a portion of several acres. The county board of revision
denied the taxpayer's application for reduction of tax
assessment under the Current Agricultural Use Value
program because the agricultural products grown by the
taxpayer were grown above the ground in pots. The court
held that the growing method was not a relevant criterion
for determination of whether the land was used for
agricultural purposes and allowed the tax reduction.
Siebenthaler v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Rev.,
598 N.E.2d 78 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
CITATION UPDATES
In re L indsey,  142 B.R.  447 (Bankr. W.D.
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